Abstract. We observe that some natural mathematical definitions are lifting properties relative to simplest counterexamples, namely the definitions of surjectivity and injectivity of maps, as well as of being connected, separation axioms T 0 and T 1 in topology, having dense image, induced (pullback) topology, and every real-valued function being bounded (on a connected domain).
Introduction. Structure of the Paper
This note was written for the De Morgan Gazette [DMG] to show that some natural definitions are lifting properties relative to the simplest counterexample, and to suggest a way to "extract" these lifting properties from the text of the usual definitions and proofs. The exposition is in the form of a story and aims to be self-contained and accessible to a first year student who has taken some first lectures in naive set theory, topology, and who has heard a definition of a category. A more sophisiticated reader may find it more illuminating to recover our formulations herself from reading either the abstract, or the abstract and the opening sentence of the next section. The displayed formulae and Figure 1 (a) defining the lifting property provide complete formulations of our theorems to such a reader.
Our approach naturally leads to a more general observation that in basic point-set topology, a number of arguments are computations based on symbolic diagram chasing with finite preorders likely accessible to a theorem prover; because of lack of space, we discuss it in a separate note [G0] .
Surjection and injection
We try to find some "algebraic" notation to (re)write the text of the definitions of surjectivity and injectivity of a function, as found in any standard textbook. We want something very straightforward and syntactic -notation for what we (actually) say, for the text we write, and not for its meaning, for who knows what meaning is anyway? (*) words "A function f from X to Y is surjective iff for every element y of Y there is an element x of X such that f (x) = y."
A function from X to Y is an arrow X −→ Y . Grothendieck(?) taught us that a point, say "x of X", is (better viewed as) as {•}-valued point, that is an arrow {•} −→ X from a(the?) set with a unique element; similarly "y of Y " we denote by an arrow {•} −→ Y . Finally, make dashed the arrows required to "exist". We get the diagram Fig. 1(b) without the upper left corner; there "{}" denotes the empty set with no elements listed inside of the brackets.
(**) words "A function f from X to Y is injective iff no pair of different points is sent to the same point of Y ."
is an arrow {•, •} −→ X from a two element set; we ignore "different" for now. "the same point" is an arrow
What about "different"? if the points are not "different", then they are "the same" point, that is an arrow {•} −→ X. Now all these arrows combine nicely into diagram Figure 1 (c). How do we read it? We want this diagram to have the meaning of the sentence (**) words above, so we interpret such diagrams as follows:
( ) "for every commutative square (of solid arrows) as shown there is a diagonal (dashed) arrow making the total diagram commutative" (see Fig. 1 (a)) (recall that "commutative" in category theory means that the composition of the arrows along a directed path depends only on the endpoints of the path) Property ( ) has a name and is in fact quite well-known [Qui] . It is called the lifting property, or sometimes orthogonality of morphisms, and is viewed as the property of the two downward arrows; we denote it by . Now we rewrite (*) words and (**) words as:
So we rewrote these definitions without any words at all. Our benefits? The usual little miracles happen:
Notation makes apparent a similarity of (*) words and (**) words : they are obtained, in the same purely formal way, from the two simplest arrows (maps, morphisms) in the category of Sets. More is true: it is also apparent that these arrows are the simplest counterexamples to the properties, and this suggests that we think of the lifting property as a category-theoretic (substitute for) negation. Note also that a non-trivial (=non-isomorphism) morphism never has the lifting property relative to itself, which fits with this interpretation.
Now that we have a formal notation and the little observation above, we start to play around looking at simple arrows in various categories, and also at not-so-simple arrows representing standard counterexamples.
You notice a few words from your first course on topology: (i) connected, (ii) the separation axioms T 0 and T 1 , (iii) dense, (iv) induced (pullback) topology, and (v) Hausdorff are, resp., (i) :
See the last two pages for illustrations how to read and draw on the blackboard these lifting properties in topology (here {• < }, {• ≷ }, ... denote finite preorders, or, equivalently, finite categories with at most one arrow between any two objects, or finite topological spaces on their elements or objects, where a subset is closed iff it is downward closed (that is, together with each element, it contains all the smaller elements). Thus { We mentioned that the lifting property can be seen as a kind of negation. Confusingly, there are two negations, depending on whether the morphism appears on the left or right side of the square, that are quite different: for example, both the pullback topology and the separation axiom T 1 are negations of the same morphism, and the same goes for injectivity and injectivity on π 0 (see Figure 1(c,d) ). 
. Naturally her first assumption would be that • denotes an arbitrary object, as that spares the extra effort needed to invent the axioms particular to the category of sets (or topological spaces) that capture that • denotes a single element, i.e. allow to treat • as a single element. (A logician understands "arbitrary" as "we do not know", "make no assumptions", and that is how formal derivation systems treat "arbitrary" objects.) Thus she would read (**) as the usual category theoretic definition of a monomorphism. Note this reading doesn't need that the underlying category has coproducts: a category theorist would think of working inside a larger category with formally added coproducts • ∨ •, and a logician would think of working inside a formal derivation system where " • " is either a built-in or "a new variable" symbol, and "
And of course, nothing prevents a category theorist to make a dual diagram
• runs through all the objects and read it as:
which is the definition of an epimorphism.
Speculations.
Does your brain (or your kitten's) have the lifting property built-in? Note [G0] suggests a broader and more flexible context making contemplating an experiment possible. Namely, some standard arguments in point-set topology are computations with category-theoretic (not always) commutative diagrams of preorders, in the same way that lifting properties define injection and surjection. In that approach, the lifting property is viewed as a rule to add a new arrow, a computational recipe to modify diagrams. Moreover, this and some other computations coming from standard theorems in point-set topology do not involve automorphisms and thus may perhaps be decidable by an algorithm [GLS] or a modification thereof. Can one find an experiment to check whether humans subconsciously use diagram chasing to reason about topology? Does it appear implicitly in old original papers and books on point-set topology? Would teaching diagram chasing hinder or aid development of topological intution in a first course of topology? Say if one defines connected, dense, Hausdorff et al via the lifting properties (i-v)?
Is diagram chasing with preorders too complex to have evolved? Perhaps; but note the self-similarity: preorders are categories as well, with the property that there is at most one arrow between any two objects; in fact sometimes these categories are thought of as 0-categories. So essentially your computations are in the category of (finite 0-) categories.
Is it universal enough? Diagram chasing and point-set topology, arguably a formalisation of "nearness", is used as a matter of course in many arguments in mathematics.
Finally, isn't it all a bit too obvious? Curiously, in my experience it's a party topic people often get stuck on. If asked, few if any can define a surjective or an injective map without words, by a diagram, or as a lifting property, even if given the opening sentence of the previous section as a hint. No textbooks seem to bother to mention these reformulations (why?). An early version of [GH-I] states (*) and (**) as the simplest examples of lifting properties we were able to think up; these examples were removed while preparing for publication.
No effort has been made to provide a complete bibliography; the author shall happily include any references suggested by readers in the next version [G] .
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